History of debate about thinking goes back to Plato in ancient Greece, who showed us logic as a process of dialogical thinking, as he modeled it through his teacher, Socrates. Aristotle refine the logical analysis that was not changed until the twentieth century. In Western culture, philosophers have relied on logic to reason the soundness of an argument. In the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Edward Glaser, Max Black, Israel Schefler, R.S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and John Passmore have argued refinements to critical thinking theory. (Thayer-Bacon, 2000)
Rene´ Descartes mind-body distinction is his most famous theses. His thesis that the mind and the body are completely distinct from each other is now called "mind-body dualism". He argues that the nature of the thinking, non-extended thing, the mind, a non-physical substance, is different from the extended non-thinking thing, the body. He further states that because of this it is possible for one to exist without the other. In Cartesian dualism, the immaterial mind and the material body are considered ontologically different substances. (Descartes, 1641)
“thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (Descartes, 1641).
He surmises that therefore a mind cannot be shaped or be put into motion, and likewise a body cannot sense anything around it. Therefore, the mind can exist separate from its body, and as this distinct substance, its essence is thought.
Gilbert Ryles (1900-1976) was a philosopher who taught at Oxford, writing a classical critique of the idea that body and mind are separate, in The Concept of Mind (1949). Ryle argued against Descartes imagining of the 'ghost' inside of us that works our clearly mechanical body. This theory of the separability of mind and body is described by Ryle as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine." He argues that if mind and body were truly separate, every human action would result from the two causes of the physical brain and the mental state. He states that knowing how to skillfully perform an act is not only possible because of being able to reason practically, but also a matter of being able to put this practical reasoning into the action. Ryle says that mental processes are just intelligent acts.
"is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized" (Ryle, 1949).
Robert Ennis wrote "A Concept of Critical Thinking" for the Harvard Educational Review in 1962, in which he discussed and explored key themes in critical thinking including skills and dispositions, rationality and absolutism, and power and knowing. (Thayer-Bacon, 2000) Ennis's original definition of critical thinking in terms of skills was
the correct assessing of statements.(Ennis, p. 83, 1962) He discussed issues of evaluating critical thinking skills. His list of critical thinking proficiencies was "the most detailed, complex, and useful to be developed, as credited by other philosophers." (Thayer-Bacon, 2000) He designed critical thinking tests, and is the coauthor of the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests (Ennis & Millman, 1982), and the "Problems in Testing Informal Logic/Critical Thinking/Reasoning Ability", (Ennis, 1984) Ennis argues that a critical person not only is well informed and seeks reason, but has a tendency to do so. (Ennis 1987, 1996)
Harvey Siegel, Israel Scheffler and Richard Paul argue Ennis's assumptions:
Siegel criticizes Ennis somewhat for seeing dispositions simply as what animates the skills of critical thinking, because this fails to distinguish sufficiently the critical thinker from critical thinking. For Siegel, a cluster of dispositions (the "critical spirit") is more like a deep-seated character trait, something like Scheffler’s notion of "a love of truth and a contempt of lying" (Siegel 1988; Scheffler 1991). It is part of critical thinking itself. Paul also stresses this distinction between skills and dispositions in his distinction between "weak-sense" and "strong-sense" critical thinking. For Paul, the "weak-sense" means that one has learned the skills and can demonstrate them when asked to do so; the "strong-sense" means that one has incorporated these skills into a way of living in which one’s own assumptions are re-examined and questioned as well. According to Paul, a critical thinker in the "strong sense" has a passionate drive for "clarity, accuracy, and fairmindedness" (Paul 1983, 23; see also Paul 1994).(Burbles & Berk 1999) (http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/burbules/papers/critical.html)
Stephen Norris further specifies that critical thinking dispositions give one the tendency to think a certain way under certain circumstances (Norris, 1994).
"...individuals must either have formed habits to use certain abilities, or overtly think and chose to use the abilities they possess. A person with an ability to think critically under certain conditions will do it, only if so disposed" (Norris, 1994).
Gavriel Salomon agreed with Norris, stating that thinking dispositions as not just a "summary label for a cluster in interrelated and relatively stable behaviors". Dispositions have a causal function and an explanatory status. Dispositions are seen by Salomon as a cluster of preferences, attitudes, and intentions, with capabilities which allow the preferences to be realized in certain ways (Salomon, 1994). Peter and Noreen Facione, who developed the Thinking Dispositions Inventory, define a thinking disposition as a constellation of attitudes, intellectual virtues, and habits of mind (Facione, Sanchez, Facione 1994). Norris discusses the difference in disposition and ability, as one can have the skill or ability to do something, but not be inclined, or disposed to do so. Therefore, critical thinkers who reason well must have the abilities and the dispositions.
Researchers are coming to recognize that content and skills is not as useful if learners do develop the capacity to look at the world critically. Ennis argues a critical person should seek reasons be well informed, but also s/he should have a tendency toward these things. (Ennis 1987, 1996). Critical thinking now comes to mean not only the capacity or skills to seek the truth and evidence by reason, but the disposition to apply these skills.
David Perkins, Eileen Jay and Shari Tishman have put forth what they call a "triadic conception of thinking dispositions," which includes the concept of ability. They delve into the concept of dispositions from a psychological viewpoint; they propose there are three psychological components which must be present in order to run dispositional behavior. These three elements are: (1) sensitivity - the perception of the appropriateness of a particular behavior; (2) inclination - the felt impetus toward a behavior; and (3) ability - the basic capacity to follow through with the behavior (Perkins, Jay & Tishman, 1993). For example, someone who is genuinely disposed to seek balanced reasons in an argument is (1) sensitive to occasions to do so (for instance while reading a newspaper editorial); (2) feels moved, or inclined, to do so; and (3) has the basic ability to follow through with the behavior, for instance, he or she can actually identify pro and con reasons for both sides of an argument.
Ennis still maintains an academic website devoted to critical thinking. http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/rhennis/ When I accessed the site on March 26, 2012, there was a note that the website was last updated on September 6, 2011. The critical thinking that appears on the website is:
Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.On this website, Ennis lists his "Super-Streamlined Conception of Critical Thinking" (6/20/02):
Assuming that critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do, a critical thinker:
1. Is open-minded and mindful of alternatives
2. Tries to be well-informed
3. Judges well the credibility of sources
4. Identifies conclusions, reasons, and assumptions
5. Judges well the quality of an argument, including the acceptability of its reasons, assumptions, and evidence
6. Can well develop and defend a reasonable position
7. Asks appropriate clarifying questions
8. Formulates plausible hypotheses; plans experiments well
9. Defines terms in a way appropriate for the context
10. Draws conclusions when warranted, but with caution
11. Integrates all items in this list when deciding what to believe or do.
David Perkins and Robert Ennis are both currently listed as being on the faculty of the National Center on Teaching Thinking (NCTT). (http://www.nctt.net/ncttfaculty.php)
More to come about critical thinking and learning dispositions-- let's explore some cognitive scientists, educational researchers, and philosophers who argue their own visions of critical thinking based in diverse research traditions (e.g., Ennis, 1992; Facione, 1984; Halpern, 1993; Johnson, 1996; Lipman, 1988; McPeck, 1981; Paul, 1993; Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993; Resnick, 1987).
References
•Burbles, N., Berk, R., Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences, and Limits, Published in Critical Theories in Education, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Lynn Fendler, eds. (NY: Routledge, 1999).
•Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 1-62.
•Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949).
•Ennis, R.H. (1962). A concept of critical thinking. Harvard Educational Review, 32, 81-111.
•Ennis, Robert H. (1980). "A conception of rational thinking." Philosophy of Education 1979 , Jerrold R. Coombs, ed. (Bloomington, IL: Philosophy of Education Society), 3-30.
•Ennis, Robert H. (1984). "Problems in testing informal logic/critical thinking/reasoning ability." Informal Logic, vol. 6 no. 1: 3-9.
•Ennis, Robert H. (1987). "A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities." Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice, Joan Boykoff Brown and Robert J. Sternberg, eds. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 9-26.
•Ennis, Robert H. (1996). Critical Thinking (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall).
•Ennis, Robert H. academic website, accessed on March 26, 2012, http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/rhennis/(a note that the website was last updated on September 6, 2011)
•Facione, P., Giancarlo (Sanchez), c., Facione, N., & Gainen (Kurfiss), 1. (1995). The disposition toward critical thinking, Journal of General Education, 44 (l), 1-25.
•Facione, P., The Disposition Toward Critical Thinking: Its Character, Measurement, and Relationship to Critical Thinking Skill, lnformal Logic Vol. 20, No.1 (2000): pp.61-84.
•Facione, P. A., Sanchez, C. A., Facione, N. C. & Gainen, J., The
Disposition toward critical thinking. Journal of General Education, Volume 44, Number(1). 1-25, 1995.
•Kaplan, Laura Duhan (1991/1994). "Teaching intellectual autonomy: The failure of the critical thinking movement." Educational Theory, vol. 41 no. 4: 361-370. Republished in Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking, Kerry S. Walters, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press).
•Norris, Stephen P., Testing for the Disposition to Think Critically, Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, Vol 14, No 2 (1992). ISSN: 0824-2577
http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2538
•Paul, R. W., (1995). Critical thinking: How to prepare students for a rapidly changing world. Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.
•Perkins, D., Jay, E., & Tishman, S. (1994). Assessing thinking: A framework for measuring critical thinking and problem solving at the college level. In A. Greenwood (Ed.), The national assessment of college student learning: Identification of the skills to be taught, learned, and assessed (pp. 65-112). Washington, DC: The US Government Printing Office.
•Perkins, D., Jay, E., & Tishman, S. (1993). Teaching thinking: From ontology to education. Educational Psychologist, 28 (1), 67-85.
•Perkins, D., Jay, E. & Tishman, S. (Guest editors, Special Issue of Educational Psychologist). (1993). New Directions in the teaching of thinking, 28 (1), 1-6.
•Salomon, G. (1994). To Be or Not To Be (Mindful)? Presented to the American Educational Research Association Meetings, New Orleans, LA.
Siegel, H. editor, Scheffler, I., Reason and Education, Essays in Honor of Israel Scheffler, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1997.
•Siegel, H. (1988), Rationality and epistemic dependence.Educational Philosophy and Theory, 20: 1–6. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1988.tb00487.x (abstract: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-5812.1988.tb00487.x/abstract)
•SIEGEL, H. (2008), Autonomy, Critical Thinking and the Wittgensteinian Legacy: Reflections on Christopher Winch, Education, Autonomy and Critical Thinking. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 42: 165–184. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2008.00611.x (abstract: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2008.00611.x/abstract)
Siegel, H. (1999), WHAT (GOOD) ARE THINKING DISPOSITIONS?. Educational Theory, 49: 207–221. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00207.x
•Thayer-Bacon, B., Transforming Critical Thinking: Thinking Constructively, Teachers College Press, New York, 2000.
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